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In 2010, the NATO Modeling and Simulation Task Group 
"Data Farming in Support of NATO" (MSG-088) has been 
established with the goal of assessing the data farming 
capabilities that NATO, PfP, and Contact Countries, schools, 
and agencies have as well as to find out in which way these 
capabilities can contribute to the development of improved 
decision support to NATO forces.
As part of the "Program of Work" of MSG-088, proof-of-
concept explorations regarding questions and models of 
interest to NATO nations are to be conducted, with the 
objective of illustrating the power of data farming for 
decision support. In order to realize this MSG-088 objective, 
the task group has planned to set up two case studies. One of 
those is taking place in the area of "Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)", whereas the second case 
study works on the topic "Force Protection". For those two 
case studies, two NATO working groups have been 
established, both contributing to IDFW. 
During IDFW23, Team 4 represented the MSG-088 case 
study team "Force protection".
The proposed scenario topic for the "Force Protection" study 
deals with the effective protection of a combat outpost 
(COP), possibly with the support of joint fire assets, in an 
Afghan mission setting against strong and coordinated 
insurgent forces.
The entire "Force Protection" scenario has been defined at the 
previous NMSG-088 meeting   2   /   IDFW 22 workshop 
including the questions we want to answer using data 
farming, the measures of effectiveness and the list of all 
input parameters that should examined. In preparation for 
the NMSG-088 meeting   4   /   IDFW   23, the scenario was 
implemented using the German agent based sensor and 
effector model PAXSEM and was reviewed at the NMSG-088 
meeting 3 in Istanbul, Turkey in July 2011. Afterwards, data 
farming experiments with the created scenario as well as 
with the defined DoE using a "Nearly Balanced Nearly 
Orthogonal Mixed Design" was conducted with PAXSEM in 
order to perform statistical analysis with the simulation 
results at this workshop.
The Overall Question
The overall question that has been agreed upon to 
investigate in this context is the following: 
"Which tactics / equipment is most robust 
against different kinds of threats?"
To answer that question, the following three subquestions 
have been defined:
1. Is there a COP configuration that performs consistently 
well?
2. What is the most dangerous threat and how does the 
robust COP work for that threat?
3. Under which circumstances can joint fire support 
improve the survivability of the COP? (Find out 
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necessary requirements e.g. early availability of joint 
fire)
The initially stated general question also contains the 
investigation of the chosen solution's robustness. To also 
incorporate this aspect, the approach agreed upon was to 
run the different COP setups or strategies, that are to be 
tested according to the questions above, against different 
kinds of insurgent threats and from these results compute 
the average performance of a specific COP setup.
Scenario Description
The general scenario setup can be described as follows:
A COP is set up next to an Afghan village. It is equipped 
with various sensor and weapon systems, which help to 
identify enemies and to protect itself. The sensors as well as 
the effectors are placed inside and outside of the COP. 
Sensors inside the COP may be positioned e.g. on set-up 
watchtowers or placed on vehicles, whereas an external 
sensor could be positioned at a observation point (OP) on a 
nearby hill to get a better overview over the area. 
Additionally, the COP has access to UAVs, which can be used 
to scan the area, and also sends out patrols, which provide the 
possibility to detect enemies before they attack the COP.
In terms of effectors, the COP on the one hand has access 
to weapon systems stationed inside the COP, like the soldiers' 
rifles, mortars and effectors placed on the vehicles stationed 
inside the COP. From outside the COP, joint fire support in 
form of helicopters, fixed wing aircrafts or artillery can be 
called in, once a suitable target has been identified.
The red forces on the other hand apply two kinds of 
tactics to attack the COP. They either attack in the form of 
homogenous long distance attacks with the help of mortars or 
sniper rifles, or they approach the COP in the form of a force-
on-force attack, seeking direct confrontation.
The course of action in this scenario is that the soldiers 
inside the COP try to have a good overview over the area 
around them, and try to reconnoiter enemies either through 
patrols, UAVs or stationary sensors placed in and around the 
COP. The insurgents on the other hand try to attack the COP 
with different tactics. As soon as the attackers have been 
reconnoitered by the soldiers, countermeasures can be 
applied, like sending out a Quick Reaction Team (QRT), 
defending themselves from inside the COP with help of rifles, 
mortars or other effectors, or by calling in joint fire support.
Figure 1: Scenario: force-on-force attack on COP
Measures of Effectiveness
The following MOEs (Measures of Effectiveness) have been 
identified as being suitable to actually identify the 
performance of the course of action in terms of the formerly 
formulated overall question:
How to define successful protection of COP?
• No blue casualties 
! MOE: percentage of blue losses
• No insurgents within small arms fire distance
! MOE: count the number of INS within given 
environment
• How long can the COP hold out until 
reinforcement / joint fire support arrives?
! MOE: count number of blue casualties within 
certain period of time
! MOE: ammunition spent
How to measure robustness?
• Steady success against varying strength / 
capabilities / tactics of INS
• Specify a target function considering weighed MOEs
General Scenario Assumptions
In defining the rough outline of the scenario, a few 
assumptions had to be made regarding the scenario in order 
to keep the investigation focused on the formerly defined 
questions. These assumptions include:
• The COP in question is generally meant to be a small, 
platoon-size COP, as attacks on large, heavily 
fortified COPs are highly unlikely.
• Though generally regarded as an important factor in 
such missions, no explicit modeling of 
communication between the different entities of the 
blue forces will be done.
• Intelligence processes won't be modeled, but the 
presence of intelligence results will be considered in 
the initial scenario setup.
• In the first step, no civilians will be modeled, as the 
involvement of these would make the scenario too 
complicated.
• The COP will be set up in the terrain next to a 
village. This implies that the COP can not attack the 
insurgents as soon as they retreat to the village 
(prevention of collateral damage).
• The COP's objectives have been defined as "Observe 
the surrounding" and "Show presence". None of the 
more complex tasks that are usually assigned to 
COPs, like setting up road checkpoints or building a 
relationship with the civilian population, are 
depicted in the scenario.
Defining Input Parameters
For the described scenario, various input parameters have 
been defined that are deemed likely to have an influence on 
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the course of the scenario and the outcome in terms of the 
formerly defined MOEs.
On the blue side, the parameters to vary can be 
summarized as follows:
• The number of sensors, effectors and vehicles at the 
COP's disposal
• The number of patrols that are being sent out by the 
COP
• Number, availability, latency and effector parameters 
of helicopters, fixed wings and artillery that can be 
used as joint fire support
• The number, type and tactics of UAVs working for 
the COP
• The number and type of stationary sensors inside 
and outside the COP
• The blue force's tactics in case they are under attack
• The proficiency of the soldiers inside the COP
• Availability of intelligence reports
On the red side, the parameters to vary are the following:
• Change between long distance and force-on-force 
attacks
• In case of long distance attacks, the number of 
attackers and their likelihood after firing to stay in 
their position or to change it
• In case of force-on-force attacks, the constellation of 
the attacking force, whether it is more small groups 
attacking or one large group of insurgents
• Effectors used by the attackers
• The insurgents' strength and proficiency
Due to the mixture and combination of the chosen input 
parameters, of which some are numerical and others 
categorical, the "Nearly Balanced Nearly Orthogonal Mixed 
Design" was chosen, which was developed at the NPS. With 
this design it will be possible to reduce the initially 
calculated number of 9 * 1027 design points based on the 26 
decision and 15 noise factors to a number of 5610 design 
points.
Results
The working team built a major analysis plan consisting of 
the following steps:
1. Check the ranges of simulation output / MOEs
2. Check distribution of input parameters
3. Check correlations using multivariate plots for 
numerical factors / contingency tables for categorical 
factors to check correlations and the validity of design
4. Descriptive statistics to validate output data
5. Generate loss functions
6. Check partition tree to find out most important factors 
(including all factors)
7. Do regression analysis through stepwise linear 
regression (choosing leave labels of partition tree) taking 
into account continuous factors
8. Determine threshold between important / unimportant 
factors
9. How to set factors to achieve lowest level of blue losses
All these steps have been done using SAS JMP. The interesting 
details are described in the following sections.
Robust Analysis
To answer the first subquestion 
"Is there a COP configuration that 
performs consistently well?"
a robust analysis was conducted using the MOE "BlueLoss" . 
The goal of the robust analysis was to look for a COP 
configuration that simultaneously yields good average 
performance and low variability through all kind of threats.
The following two alternatives to perform the robust 
analysis on the MOE "BlueLoss" have been considered:
The first alternative uses a loss function that captures the 
average performance and volatility, looking for consistent 
good performance. The loss function should have a target 
value that represents a desirable and achievable value e.g. 
5% blue losses. Therefore the quadratic loss function 
floss(BluesLoss) = (BlueLoss -0.05)2 
was used as the target value for a  regression analysis, to find 
the most influencing factors to minimize the loss function.
The second alternative is to compute the mean and standard 
deviation for  the MOE "BlueLoss" grouped by all decision 
factors. Then two separate regressions are performed to find 
the most influencing factors: one regression for the mean and 
one regression for the standard deviation of the blue losses 
as a response factor considering all decision factors.
Both alternatives led to similar  results. Using the given loss 
function for  the blue losses and performing a regression tree 
(see figure 2), the following decision factors were identified to 
be most important:
The ammunition supply, the soldier's proficiency level, the 
number of medium machine guns and guided rockets need to 
be maximized.
Figure 2: Part of the regression tree 
on the loss function for blue losses
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An additional regression analysis did not enhance the 
insights. But adding the number of blue forces to the model 
improved the robust results which shows, that the overall 
force size is important to survivability of the COP.
Robust COP Configuration for Most 
Dangerous Threat
To answer the second subquestion 
"What is the most dangerous threat and how does the robust 
COP work for that threat?"
the most dangerous threat has to be identified first.
Therefore a partition tree was build using the previous loss 
function (target value 5%) but now considering all noise 
factors as input factors. This showed that certain insurgent 
configurations (e.g. the long distance attack with many 
indirect fire weapons) result in the highest blue losses (mean 
of 88% of blue losses).
The intersection of the subset of most dangerous insurgent 
configuration with the subset of the most robust COP 
configuration shows the requested COP performance on the 
most dangerous threat. Looking at the distribution of blue 
losses showed, that the most robust COP does substantially 
reduce the blue losses (mean of 44% of blue losses). See figure 
3.
Figure 3: Distribution of blue losses of the most robust COP 
against the most dangerous threat
Scenario improvements
Trying to answer the third subquestion about the impact of 
fire support assets showed that the request for fire support in 
the scenario was always requested way too late so that there 
was almost no impact on the simulation outcome. Because this 
doesn't reflect the reality some minor scenario changes have 
been defined, so that the fire support may be requested earlier:
• The UAV and sensor towers may detect any suspicious 
persons or vehicles. At this point, fire support assets may 
already be requested for preparation
• To be able to identify the insurgents and immediately call 
for fire support, a quick reaction team (QRT) is send out 
of the COP after the detection to perform the 
identification
These scenario modifications shall be implemented until the 
next IDFW24 / NMSG-088 Meeting 6 in Monterey in March 
2012, to continue the analysis using the new result data of the 
updated farming experiment.
SUMMARY AND FURTHER STEPS
Great progress could be achieved during this week of 
collaborative work and important steps towards conducting 
the case study "Force Protection" could be made. Due to all 
the valuable inputs from experts in the military, DoE and 
M&S fields, it has been possible to conduct a  first analysis on 
the data  farming results to answer the first two of the three 
subquestions of this case study. We are on a good way to 
show how the data farming methodology is capable to be 
used to answer analysis questions in the military area.
Currently, the further plans for the "Force Protection" case 
study is to implement the necessary scenario modifications 
into the model PAXSEM and to conduct the data farming 
experiments with the modified scenario as well as with the 
adjusted DoE. So the results of these experiments will be 
presented for analysis at next IDFW24 / NMSG-088 Meeting 6 
in Monterey in March 2012.
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